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OMNIBUS HEARINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES IN
NORTH DAKOTA FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
DAvID L. PETERSON*
Pre-trial discovery processes in criminal cases have, until very
recent years, been virtually nonexistent. Some of the traditional
reasons set forth in opposition to broad discovery in criminal cases
were: that some defense counsel were untrustworthy; that there was
a possibility of intimidating witnesses, if their identity was known;
fear of prematurely disclosing the identity of informants; and the
supposed advantage to the prosecution of surprise. However, in the
1960's there apparently arose a realization that some of the argu-
ments against broad discovery procedures in criminal cases were
not sound.
Countervailing considerations which are set forth by those desir-
ing broader pre-trial discovery in criminal cases include the need
for changes that will protect the defendant's procedural rights at
every stage, thus lending more finality to criminal cases and allevi-
ating many post conviction proceedings based on some procedural
error in the pretrial and trial proceedings. Also recognized is the
fact that the public interest is served by genuine plea discussions,
which often result in pleas of guilty (accounting for a vast majority
of criminal case dispositions). Furthermore, it is argued that the
use of extensive pretrial discovery results in the identification and
disposition of potentially significant constitutional issues early in the
proceedings. Additionally, it is argued that if inexperienced counsel
are appointed to defend an accused they will be better equipped to
present a defense if they participate in pre-trial discovery.
During 1972 the federal courts in North Dakota have initiated
a procedure in some criminal cases called an Omnibus Hearing.
The Omnibus Hearing is so named because it is intended to serve
B.S., B.A., 1966, J.D., 1968, University of North Dakota; Assistant United States
Attorney, North Dakota, 1972-present.
The statements and opinions contained herein are those only of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the position of the North Dakota United States Attorney's Office
or the Department of Justice.
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as an all-purpose hearing dealing with a wide variety of matters
in a systematic and simplified way. The North Dakota Federal Dis-
trict Court uses an Order On Omnibus Pre-Trial Conference form
which is attached to this article as Appendix "A."' Its practice
is to notify the defense counsel of the Omnibus procedure. If counsel
and the defendant agree to participate, they submit a signed form
to the court. 2 Once the defendant agrees to participate the govern-
ment may refuse to participate within three days. The court also
suggests that counsel for the defendant and counsel for the govern-
ment meet at their convenience and review the Omnibus form
and agree on and disclose as many things as they can prior to
appearing before the court. A date is then set at which time
the defendant, his counsel, and the prosecution meet with the
court. At this meeting, areas of disagreement are discussed and
the parties make various motions pursuant to the order, which
the court then grants or denies. Some motions require separate
hearings such as a motion to suppress certain evidence and the
court sets a date for a hearing on such a motion at some time in
the future.
In 1944, the Advisory Committee of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure first recommended the language for the predecessor of
the present Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 8
This language was adopted in 1946 and provided:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of
the indictment or information, the Court may order the at-
torney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents
or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defend-
ant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon
a showing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making
the inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (em-
phasis added)
4
The defendant was forced to carry the burden and show the
materiality of the items sought and further, he had to show that
his request was reasonable.
5
Continued study of discovery in criminal cases led to further
revision of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules and a so-called "liberal
1. Hereinafter referred to as Order.
2. See Appendix B.
8. Hereinafter referred to as Fed. R. Crim. P.
* 4. 8 MOORES, FEDERAL PRACTICE, Section 16.02[2] (1972).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Abrams, 29 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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rule" was adopted in 1966, which is the one under which the
courts now operate. Further revision of Rule 16 is still being discussed.
The United States Supreme Court set the tone for broader crim-
inal pre-trial discovery when it stated in 1966 that "the growing
realization [is] that disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant
materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal
justice .... ,,6
The limited experience which this writer has had with the Omni-
bus Hearing procedure 7 now being used in the western half of
the District of North Dakota clearly shows that if the United States
Attorney's office is ordered by the court to disclose, or if he volun-
tarily discloses, everything which can be requested on the Omnibus
form, the result is that the defendant will get far more information
than he is allowed under current court rules, federal statutes and
court decisions.
A. DISCOVERY BY THE DEFENDANT
Parts A (1 through 9) of the pre-trial order cover the discovery
which is made possible for the defendant if he participates in
the Omnibus Hearing. A (1) of the order basically asks if the defend-
ant has had full discovery and if he has inspected the government
file. In some of the cases which have been handled since the incep-
tion of the Omnibus Hearing, the United States Attorney's office
has allowed the defendant to have full access to the file; in others,
some portions of the investigative reports are withheld. In no case
has the suggestion been made that the government inspect the de-
fendant's files.
A (2) questions whether or not the government has disclosed all
the evidence in its possession which is favorable to the accused.
This relates to the disclosure first required by Brady v. Maryland."
It should be noted however, that the disclosure allowed by Rule 161
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is actually broader than
that required by Brady.9
A (3) of the form has three parts. The first part relates to mo-
tions by the defendant for discovery of all oral, written or recorded
statements or memoranda of them which was made by the defendant
to the investigating officers. This falls directly under the provisions
of Federal Rule 16(a), which has been held to give the defendant
an "almost automatic right" to his written or recorded statements
6. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
7. Hereinafter referred to as Omnibus.
8. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9. United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Hemphill v. United States,
892 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968) ; 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 515. (1969).
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or confessions.'0 Also, summary reports and interview memoranda
that are made by government agents setting forth the substance of
the defendant's remarks "in detail and in length" are discoverable.1 '
At least one court has held that the statements need not even be
given to a government agent. 12 Many courts also have held that
the government must show "particular and substantial" reasons
why motions for these statements should not be granted. 13
The second part of A(3) relates to a motion for discovery
of the names of the government's witnesses and their statements.
The granting of this motion goes far beyond what is now the
law relating to discovery pursuant to Federal Rule 16(b) and 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). The law appears to be settled that the govern-
ment does not have to disclose to the defendant the names of
the government witnesses under the provisions of Rule 16.14
The clear language of Rule 16 (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a) (1970)
provide that the witnesses' statement is discoverable after the wit-
ness has testified, thus precluding pre-trial discovery of its contents. 5
Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1970) provides that only the por-
tion of the statement that relates to the witness' direct testimony
is discoverable. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has
held that 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) is the exclusive means for obtaining
any statements of government witnesses that were made before
trial. 6 Additionally, statements made by co-defendants are gen-
erally not discoverable.
17
One area of contention under this provision that has arisen
several times is what portion, if any, of a government agent's
investigative report is discoverable. It seems clear that the entirety
of the agent's report is not discoverable at pre-trial proceedings.
However, if the government does call the agent as a witness,
then the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (3) (1) include the agent's
reports as discoverable material. 8
Even if the agent testifies, only that portion of his report that
relates to his testimony on direct examination can be produced under
10. United States v. Federman, 41 F.R.D. 339 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
11. United States v. Morrison, 43 F.R.D. 516, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v.
Garret, 305 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
12. United States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107 (2nd Cir. 1969).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 299 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (S.D. N.Y. 1969)
United States v. Isa, 413 F.2d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1969).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Cullen, 305 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Wis. 1969) ; United States
v. Eageston, 417 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1969).
15. United States v. Hon. Thomas R. McMillen, - F.2d- (7th Cir. 1972); Sendejas
V. United States, 428 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1970), cer. denied 400 U.S. 879 (1970); Gola-
her v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 528 (9h Cir. 1969).
16. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Mahany, 305 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1969) United
States v. Fassler, 46 F.R.D. 43 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
18. Lewis v. United States, 340 F.2d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 1965).
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the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (c). Whether the substance of the
report is covered on direct examination and thus producible after
the witness is through testifying is to be determined by the judge.1 9
The general rule is that the statement or report must relate to the
events and activities testified to by the witness and not his general
background.
20
If the government claims that portions of the statements are
irrelevant, then 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (c) provides that the trial court
must inspect the statements in camera and delete the unrelated
portions before delivering it to the defendant.
Perhaps the Court in United States v. Barber1 said it best when
it stated that motions to inspect statements and reports of FBI Agents
. . . will be denied as they are likewise exempt from produc-
tion under Rule 16 (b), being internal government documents
made in connection with the investigation and prosecution
of the case. (citations omitted) This, however, does not pre-
clude their production at trial for purposes of cross-exami-
nation if the FBI Agents should testify.
The third part of A (3) relates to a motion to inspect all physical
or documentary evidence in the government's possession. This mo-
tion is akin to Rule 16 (b) which provides that the court "may" allow
inspection of books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings
or places. The word "may" is important as the allowance of inspec-
tion of such items is not an "automatic right" as is the case in re-
lation to the defendant's own statements. In addition, the defend-
ant must show the materiality of the items he wishes to inspect
and that his request is reasonable. 2 But what is material and what
is reasonable? It has been held that anything which the government
plans to introduce in evidence against a defendant is material and
a request for production of that evidence is reasonable. 23 Addition-
ally, Rule 16(b) applies only to documents which are in the "pos-
session" of the government. This is not as broad as the requirement
of production under 16(a), which calls for disclosure of statements
which the government "knows" about.
19. United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490 (2nd Cir. 1964).
20. United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 615-16 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375
U.S. 822 (1963).
21. United States v. Barber, 297 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1969).
22. United States v. Mahany, 305 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (N.D. fl1. 1969) ; United States
v. Morrison, 43 F.R.D. 516, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
23. United States v. Hrubik, 280 F. Supp. 481 (D. Alam. 1968); For further guide-
lines on maiteriality and reasonableness see, United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp. 907
(E.D. 3l1. 1962).
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The government does not have to supply documents if the de-
fendant has equal access to these documents."
The provisions found on A (4) of the form follow the provisions
of Rule 16(g) and are merely a continuing motion for production
of all the items covered by A (1), A (2) and A (3) that subsequently
come into the government's possession.
A (5) of the form has seven parts labeled (a) through (g). They
allow the defendant to make certain motions requesting information
which, if ordered to be given or given voluntarily, will in essence
disclose the primary aspect of the government's case to the defend-
ant. These disclosures seem to remove the guess work required by
the defense as to the case that the prosecution has against its client.
Although such disclosures of government strategy do not seem
to be required, it appears that the disclosures allow both sides to
get to the real issues of the case very quickly. A (5) a asks if the
government will rely on prior acts or convictions of a similar nature
for proof of knowledge or intent.
The law appears to be clear that the government may rely on
prior and subsequent similar crimes to prove the intent of the de-
fendant to commit the crime which has been charged. 2 Any subse-
quent acts which are similar to the crime charged in the indictment
are admissible on the issue of intent if these acts are not too distant
in time.2 6 The form provides that the defendant may stipulate as
to prior convictions without waiving his right to object to their intro-
duction on grounds other than authenticity.
A (5) b provides for disclosure of whether the government will
call expert witnesses and if so, allows disclosure of their names,
qualifications, subject of testimony, and disclosure of the expert's
report. This too allows much broader discovery than the former
practice.
A(5)c allows the defendant to obtain reports of physical or
mental examinations in the control of the government. This also
relates to Rule 16(a) which provides that upon the motion of the
defendant, the Court may order the government to permit copying,
photographing or inspection of any relevant results or reports of
physical or mental examinations.
Rule 16(a) has been interpreted to provide for the disclosure of
these materials.
27
24. United States v. Ball. 49 F.R.D. 153 (E.D Wis. 1969); United States v Love, 42
F.R.D. 661 (D. N.H. 1967).
25. United States v. Johnson, 382 F.2d 280 (2nd Cir. 1967); United States v. Klein,
340 F.2d 547 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 850 (1965).
99. United States v. Smith, 283 F.2d 760 (2nd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 816
(1.961) ; United States v. Marchislo, 344 F.2d 653, 667 (2nd Cir. 1965).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 437 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v.
Turner, 274 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
HEARING IN CRIMINAL CASES
A (5) d is a request for reports of scientific tests, experiments
or comparisons and other reports of experts that the government
has which pertain to the case. The language of Rule 16(a) provides
for this disclosure.28
A (5)e provides for the inspection and copying of books, papers,
documents, photographs or tangible objects which the government
received from or which belong to the defendant or which will be
used at the hearing or trial. This follows closely the provisions
of Rule 16 (b), which authorizes the Court to order discovery of these
items, but only if the request is reasonable and the items are
material.2 9 It has been held that Rule 16 (b) only applies to items
in the control, custody and possession of the government and thus
the discovery allowed is not as broad as is allowed by Rule 16 (a),
which provides for discovery of items "known" to the government.
Rule 16 (b), however, does not apply to reports, memos and internal
governmental documents prepared by government agents.80
A (5) f allows the government to supply the defendant with a
list of prior convictions of any person the government intends to
call as a witness. This would appear to be far more than what
the present statutes, court rules and cases allow, because if the
government is not required to provide a list of its witnesses or their
statements, it follows that the government would not have to provide
a means for impeachment of its own witnesses. On the other hand,
it could conceivably be argued that such information would be prop-
erly discoverable under the Brady v. ,Marylands, doctrine requiring
disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused.
A(5)g is a provision requesting the government to disclose its
intentions to use prior felony convictions for impeachment of the
defendant if he should testify. This use of course is a trial strategy
that would not ordinarily be discoverable. The result of disclosing
to the defendant that he can be subject to cross examination on
prior felony convictions might bear heavily on his decision to remain
silent or to testify. The government has the right to impeach a
witness by cross examining him as to prior convictions of a felony
or a crime involving moral turpitude.8 2 It has been held, however,
that the trial court has some discretion in declining to allow the
use of these prior convictions for impeachment. 83 Some courts
28. See United States v. Bel Mar Laboratories, 284 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
29. United States v. Mahany, 305 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. I1. 1969).
30. Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520- (9th Cir. 1969).
31. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
32. United States v. Owens, 263 F.2d 720 (2nd Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Provoo,
215 F.2d 531 (2nd Cir. 1954).
33. United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1968); cert. denied, 394 U.S.
947 (1969).
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have held that such discretion should be used sparingly." The New
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 5 which
become effective July 1, 1973, unless rejected by Congress, contain
the general law as it now exists. Rule 609 allows the use of criminal
convictions for impeachment if they are those generally regarded as
felonies or those involving dishonesty or false statements. Under the
Rules of Evidence only convictions within the last ten years are al-
lowed to be used for impeachment.36
A further provision of A (5)g allows the defendant to stipulate
as to his prior convictions, but maintains his right to object to their
admission on grounds other than authenticity.
Part A (6) of the Omnibus form requires the government to
disclose whether the proceedings before the grand jury were record-
ed and if they were recorded the government is required to state
whether or not a transcript will be provided to the defendant.
It also allows the defendant to move for production of the recordings.
It is not required that testimony before a grand jury be record-
ed.3 T The provisions of Rule 16 are also applicable here however,
and some of the general law relating to production of testimony
before a grand jury, if such testimony is recorded, indicates that
a defendant is entitled to copies of his testimony made before a
grand jury.88 As to testimony of other grand jury witnesses it is
generally not discoverable by way of pre-trial motions but is dis-
coverable after the witness has testified, if the defendant shows
a particularized need. 9
Part A (7) of the Omnibus Order provides for disclosure by the
government as to whether an informer was involved; if an informer
will be called as a witness; and whether the government will provide
the defendant with the name, address and phone number of the
informant or if the government will claim privilege of nondisclosure.
If the government claims the privilege then the defendant may
use the Order to move for disclosure.
The law is well settled that the government generally has the
privilege of refusing to disclose the identity of informants at trial. 0
The court in Roviaro'1 stated that:
34. See, e.g., United States v. Cacchillo, 416 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1969).
35. Revised Draft of 1971, FsD. R. Ev. (R.D. 1971), which appears in permanent form
in 51 F.R.D. 315 [Hereinafter referred to as Rules of Evidence].
36. FED. R. Ev. 609(b) (R.D. 1971).
37. United Stales v. Barson, 4,34 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
39. United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970).
40. McCray v. United States, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957).
41. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
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The purpose of the privilege is furtherance and protection
of the public interest in effective law enforcement.42
However, the Roviaro decision went on to state that there
is "no fixed rule" concerning disclosure and that disclosure:
. . . must depend on the particular circumstances of each
case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the pos-
sible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's
testimony, and other relevant factors.
In Wigmore's treatise on Evidence it is mentioned that:
Communications of this kind ought to receive encouragement.
They are discouraged if the informer's identity is disclosed.48
Often the question in this area is whether the informer should
be identified prior to trial rather than at trial. In commenting
on that point the United States Supreme Court has said:
. . . . the Court in the exercise of its power to formulate
evidentiary rules for federal criminal cases has consistently
declined to hold that an informer's identity need always be
disclosed, in a federal criminal trial, let alone in a prelimi-
nary hearing to determine probable cause for an arrest or
search."
The privilege of nondisclosure is not an absolute privilege. Thus,
if the defendant can show that disclosure is necessary to insure a
fair trial, the informer's identity must be disclosed.45 It has been
held that there is no need to disclose the identity of an informer
if he is not an active participant in the crime, or if he is not a witness
to the crime."
The foregoing general law has for the most part been incor-
porated into the New Rules of Evidence to become effective on
July 1, 1973, unless rejected by Congress.47
Part A(8) of the Omnibus Order provides for disclosure of
whether or not any electronic surveillance has been made of the
defendant or his premises and whether or not any leads developed
42. Id. at 62.
43. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2374 at 761-62 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
44. McGray v. United States, 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967).
45. United States v. Hanna, 341 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Coke, 339
F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964).
46. United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971) ; See also Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1955). United States, 353 U.S. 63 (1957) ; Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 5F2
(5th Cir. 1955).
47. FED. R. Ev. 510 (R.D. 1971).
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from such surveillance. The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution has been held not to proscribe wiretapping. 8
Federal law since 1934, however, has prohibited the unauthorized
interception and divulgence of a telephone conversation. 49 Presently
the matter of wiretapping is covered by the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.50 It also includes prohibitions against
other forms of electronic surveillance. Evidence which is obtained
in violation of the statutory law is generally inadmissible. 1
Part A (9) of the Omnibus Order provides for disclosure to
the defendant of any information the government has indicating
entrapment. This disclosure could possible fall under the purview
of the rule that evidence favorable to the accused must be disclosed
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.52 Ordinarily a defendant can plead
entrapment only if he admits that he committed the crime charged.58
Entrapment is said to occur when the criminal conduct was the
product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials." The
entrapment defense does not extend to inducement by private citi-
zens, but is available if government agents acted through private
citizens.55 The government is not guilty of entrapment by merely
affording an opportunity for continuing an established course of crim-
inal conduct.
5 6
B. DISCOVERY BY THE GOVERNMENT
Part B of the Omnibus form pertains to discovery by the govern-
ment. Many of these discovery matters are covered by Rule 16 (c)
which basically provides that if the court grants the relief sought
by the defendant under Rules 16 (a) 2 and 16 (b), it may upon motion
grant certain discovery to the government. However, authorized
discovery by the government has to be regulated by the accused's
Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination."
48. Olmstea v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); See also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 605.
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
51. Bernant v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Nardone v. United States, 802
U.S. 379 (1937).
52. Supra note 8.
53. United States v. Hendricks, 456 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1972).
54. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) ; See also Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
55. United States v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905 (2nd Cir. 1969) a!f'd 396 U.S. 87 (1969)
See also Pearson v. United States, 378 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967).
56. United States V. Dono, 428 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829
(1920).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. No person shall be held to answer for a capitol, or other-
wise infamous crime .. . nor shall he be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ....
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Parts B (10) a-e provide for various responses the defendant may
make to the government's requests relating to competency, insanity
and diminished mental responsibility. The disclosures to be made
are whether there will be a claim of incompetency to stand trial;
whether there will be reliance on a defense of insanity; whether
the defendant has supplied names of lay and professional witness
on the insanity issue; whether defendant has permitted the govern-
ment to inspect and copy all the medical reports under his control
or the control of his attorney, and; whether the defendant will
or will not submit to a psychiatric examination by a court-appointed
doctor on the issue of his insanity at the time of the offense.
There is no provision for the government to make a motion for
disclosure of this information, contrary to many of the disclosure
possibilities on the Omnibus form under discovery for the defendant.
Furthermore, if there is a claim of incompetency to stand trial
because of insanity or diminished responsibility, the defendant would
have to raise it prior to trial. Ordinarily, the trial judge is, at
the outset of a trial, going to be unaware of relevant facts relating
to the merits of a defense or claim of insanity. Thus, it is the defend-
ant's responsibility to raise the issue of insanity as well as the issue
of a request for a bifurcated trial.58  Additionally, federal law
requires the United States Attorney to file a motion to have
a judicial determination of the mental competency of the accused
if there is reasonable cause to believe that he is presently insane
or mentally incompetent to understand the charges against him
and assist in his own defense. 59 Obviously, if there is a judicial
proceeding on the competency or insanity question the government
would be advised of it before the main trial.Thus, the government
is not gaining anything from the possible disclosures under B (10) a-e.
Where the mental state of the accused is at issue it is in the
interest of justice for the trial court to permit both the defendant
and the government full access to the reports and conclusions
of all psychiatric witnesses. 60 Rule 16 (c) also provides for disclosure
to the government of such reports conditioned on the granting of a
defendant's motion under Rule 16 (a) (2).
It appears that the trial court has the power, if not the responsi-
bility, to order the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination
in certain cases.6 1 Allowing a court-appointed psychiatrist to testify
58. Parrnen v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
858 (1968) ; Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281 (1967).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 4244.
60. United States v. Carr, 437 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 4.01 U.S. 920
(1970).
61. Tanner v. United States, 434 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912
(1971) ; United States v. WeJser, 428 F.2d 932 (2nd Cir. 1969).
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on the basis of the psychiatric examination has been held not
to be a violation of the defendant's right against self incrimination.6
2
Part B (11)a-b is a provision allowing the defendant to disclose
whether he will rely on alibi as a defense and whether he has pro-
vided the government with a list of his alibi witnesses. Again
this possible disclosure appears purely voluntary since no provision
is made for allowing the government to make a motion for such
disclosure. The United States Supreme Court has held that a notice
of alibi rule which provided that the defendant disclose when he was
going to rely on alibi as a defense and also provide a list of his alibi
witnesses, which further required the state to provide a list of its
alibi witnesses on rebuttal, did not violate the Fifth Amendment
rights of the accused.68
The Court in Williams v. Florida" stated:
Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defend-
and as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of
the State's case before announcing the nature of his de-
fense ...
Petitioner concedes that absent the notice-of-alibi rule the
constitution would raise no bar to the Court's granting the
State a continuance at trial on the ground of surprise as soon
as the alibi witness is called.
But if so utilizing a continuance is permissible under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, then surely the same re-
sult may be accomplished through pre-trial discovery, as
it was here, avoiding the necessity of a disrupted trial.
(emphasis added)
It would thus appear there would be no error committed if
the court were to order the disclosure relating to alibi upon motion.
Part B(12)a-b relates to whether the defendant has disclosed
to the government the results of scientific tests. There again is no
provision for the government to make a motion for production. How-
ever, under Rule 16(c) it clearly appears that the government has
a right to this disclosure provided the court has granted the defend-
ants' motions under Rule 16(a) (2). All of these Rule 16(a) (2) mo-
tions are under part A (5) of the omnibus order.
Part B (13) (a) 1-6 relates to disclosure of the defendant's defense.
It appears that the holding in Williams v. Florida6" has disposed
of the self incrimination arguments made against such disclosure.
This is done on a voluntary basis although it would seem that
62. United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932 (2nd Cir. 1969).
63. Williams v. Florida, 939 U.S. 78 (1969).
64. Id. at 85-86.
65. Id.
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if the government made a motion for such disclosure the court
could properly order the disclosure on the authority of Williams.
Part B (13) b provides for disclosure of whether the defendant
will waive the husband and wife privilege. Presumably, the husband
and wife privilege referred to on the form includes both the marital
communication privilege and the adverse testimony privilege. The
marital communicatons ". . . privilge, generally, extends only to
utterances and not to acts." 66
It has been stated that the four basic factors that are considered
in determining whether the privilege should be allowed are whether:
1. The communications originate in confidence.
2. The confidence is essential to the relation.
3. The relation is a proper object of encouragement by the
law.
4. The injury that would inure to it by disclosure is probably
greater than the benefit that would result in judicial in-
vestigation of the truth.67
The adverse testimony privilege prohibits the spouses testimony
regardless of the extent of knowledge. However, it can be asserted
only during the existence of the marriage and is destroyed by the
death or divorce of the spouse.6 8
-The new proposed Rules of Evidence contain a husband-wife
privilege.69 The Rules basically retain the husband-wife ad-
verse testimony privilege but it is stated in the committee's
advisory notes following Rule 505 that "the rule recognizes no
privilege for confidential communications." However, if there is a
valid reason for retaining either the marital communication priv-
ilege or the adverse testimony privilege in the new Rules of Evidence
then there is far greater reason to retain the communication priv-
ilege. It would seem that if one made an incriminatory statement
to his or her spouse that it would be more deserving of protection
than would be the protection of fact testimony relating to acts
performed by the spouse.
Under present law7 0 and under the proposed Rules of Evidence
71
there are exceptions to the husband-wife privilege. The most impor-
tant exception is that if the crime is committed against the spouse
or a child of either; the one committing the crime cannot preclude
66. Pereira v. United States 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) ; See also United States v. Mitchell,
137 F.2d 1006, 1009 (2nd Cir. 1943) cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1943). 8 WIOmORE, EVI-
DENCE, § 2337 at 657 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
67. 8 WIOMORE, EVmENCE, § 2332 at 642 (McNaughton Rev. 1961),
68. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
69. FED. R. Ev. 505 (R.D. 1971).
70. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960),
71. IBD. R. Ev. 505(c) (I.D. 1971).
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the testimony of his or her spouse by claiming the husband-wife
privilege.
Parts 13c,d,e and f refer to disclosures relating to whether
the defendant will testify; call additional witnesses; call character
witnesses; or supply names, addresses and phone numbers of his
witnesses. The Omnibus Order contains a choice of "will," "may"
or "will not" and in virtuaally every case in which this writer has
participated, the word "may" has been chosen. Thus the government
gains no useful iniformaton.
The disclosures provided for under B (14) are really not discovery
disclosures because they are matters which of necessity must be
discussed by the government and the defendant before trial. Part
B (14) a merely provides for disclosure of whether the defendant
knows of any constitutionala problems such as those involved in
pre-trial procedure, arrest and search and seizure. Part B (14) b
is a provision allowing the defendant to disclose whether he wishes
to present to the court any motion or matter other than those
included on the Omnibus form. And finally, Parts B (14) c & d
merely refer to whether there is a probability of disposition of
the case without trial and whether the defendant will waive a
jury trial.
C. MOTIONs REQUIRING SEPARATE HEARINGS BEFORE A U.S. DIs-
TRICT COURT JUDGE
Part C of the Omnibus form relates to motions which require
a separate hearing before the district judge. Part C (15) of the Omni-
bus Order has to do with motions for suppression of physical evi-
dence and admissions and confessions and requires a separate hear-
ing before the district judge. Because of the vast amount of law
covering these matters, the individually listed grounds for the motions
will not be dealt with here. If a motion to suppress is made, an
evidentiary hearing is held and the Court must determine if the
evidence must be suppressed or allowed to stand.
Part C (16) a provides for a motion for dismissal of the indictment
or information because of failure to state an offense. Rule 12 sets
forth guidelines relating to the defenses and objections that can
be raised. The objection that the indictment fails to charge an
offense may be raised before the trial by a motion to dismiss.72
An indictment may also be attacked subsequent to a plea of guilty
if it fails to allege an offense.7 8 The court may also take notice
72. Universal Milk Bottle Service v. United States, 188 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1951).
73. United States v. Briscoe, 428 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 966
(1970) (rehearing deniedQ, 401 U.S. 926 (1971).
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of the failure of the indictment to charge an offense at any time
during the proceedings.
74
Part C (16) b allows a motion to dismiss the indictment, or infor-
mation or a count because of duplicity. Duplicity of charges would
appear to be a defect in the institution of the prosecution and thus,
must be raised by motion before trial.75 Duplicity in an indictment
means the charging of more than one offense in a count.76 In a situ-
ation where there is duplicity because two distinct crimes are
charged in one count, the count is void because the defendant
is denied the unanimous concurrence of a jury on each offense
charged before conviction.77
Part C(16)c is the basis for a motion to sever the defendants
case and for a separate trial.
Rule 8(a) allows joinder of two or more offenses in the same
indictment or information and Rule 8 (b) allows joinder of two or
more defendants in the same indictment or information if they al-
legedly participated in the same transaction constituting the offense.
Rule 13 allows the court to order joint trial of indictments
or informations against defendants if they could have been joined
in a single indictment or information. Rule 14 gives the court the
power on its own motion, or upon a motion by the defendant, to
sever the cases of jointly indicted defendants or to sever jointly
alleged offenses if joinder is prejudicial.
Separate trials by way of a motion for severance are not a mat-
ter of right,78 and granting of motions for severance falls squarely
within the trial court's discretion.79 The trial judge is, however,
under a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to take whatever
action is appropriate to counter any unfair prejudice that may
arise.80 The trial judge's ruling on severance matters is subject to
reversal only when there is a showing of an abuse of his discretion,81
or when clear prejudice is shown.82 Motions for severance must
be timely made.83
74. United States v. Vannatta, 189 F. Supp. 937 (D. Hawaii 1960): See albo FED.
R. CRTM. P. 12(b)(2).
75. PEn. R. CalM. P. 16(b) (2). See also Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules
following Rule 16.
76. United States v. Barndom. 320 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Mo. 1970) ; United States v.
Zolli, 51 FED. R.D. 522 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
77. United States v. Warner, 429 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970).
78. Barnes v. United States, 347 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1965).
79. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 416 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1969); Bailey v.
United States, 410, F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1969).
80. United States v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 494. (D.C. Cir. 1970).
81. United States v. Rosselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
82. United States v. Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1024 (1971), cert denied, 401 U.S. 943 (1972).
83. United States v. Melville, 312 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). See also United
States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232 (3rd Cir. 1971) where the court held that if
a motion was not made Prior to trial it was not timely; United States v. Parslon, 452 F:2d
1007 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court held that when defendant did not move for sever-
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Part C(16)d provides for a motion to sever certain counts
of an indictment or information and for separate trial thereon.
Rule 8(a) FRCP provides for joinder of offenses. A motion for sev-
erance of the counts in an indictment or information is directed to
the discretion of the trial court.84 The discussion of Part C(16)c
of the Omnibus Order is also pertinent here.
Part C(16)e authorizes a motion for a bill of particulars. Rule
7(f) provides that the court may direct the filing of a bill of parti-
culars. The Rule further states that such a motion should be made
before arraignment or within ten days after arraignment, although
it can be permitted at a later time. Bills of particulars are to be
granted only where they are necessary in order to inform the ac-
cused of the charge against him with sufficient precision to enable
him to prepare a defense; to avoid surprise; and to enable him
to plead his acquittal in bar of any further prosecution for the same
offense.8 5 A motion for a bill of particulars is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court86 and denial of the motion is seldom
reversible error unless there is a showing that the defendant was
unfavorably surprised or prejudiced at the trial by the government
evidence.8 7 On the other hand, a bill of particulars is not to be used
as a device for disclosure of the government's case in advance
of tria s nor can it be used to inquire into the government's
legal theory of a case.89 Furthermore, it has been held that a de-
fendant is not entitled to the names of the government witnesses
by way of a bill of particulars."
Part C(16)f contains a motion for taking the deposition of a
witness for testimonial purposes. Depositions of witnesses may be
taken in certain instances pursuant to federal statute91 and the
criminal rules.9 2 Depositions may only be taken in criminal cases
by order of the court and are not to be allowed as a matter
of right.9 8 The burden of showing the necessity for taking a depo-
ance he had waived his objection, to misjoinder; It has also been held that failure to for-
mally move for a severance constitutes a waiver of any future objections, United States
ex rel. Dixon v. Careli, 284 F. Supp. 535 (3rd Cir. 1969).
84. United States v. Sanders. 463 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Corallo,
309 F. Supp. 1282 (D.C. N.Y. 1970) ; United States v. Claytor, 52 FED. R.D. 360 (D.C.
N.Y. 1971).
85. United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (D.C. N.Y. 1959) rev'd. on other
grounds, 285 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Rubino, 320 F. Supp. 613 (D.C.
Pa. 1970).
86. Turner v. United States, 426 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1970).
87. United States v. Kushner, 135 F.2d 668 (2nd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 212
(1943).
88. United States v. Poindexter, 325 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); United States v.
Bearden, 423 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970).
89. Unlited States v. Verra, 203 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
90. Nipp v. United States, 422 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Glass, 421
F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1969).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3503.
92. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
93. United States v. Massi, 277 F. Supp. 371 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
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sition is on the defendant that desires the deposition."4 Furthermore,
despoitions in criminal cases are only to be used in exceptional
cases.
95
Part C (16)g gives authority for a motion to require the govern-
ment to secure the appearance of a witness who is subject to
government direction at the trial. The court, in its discretion, can
order production of witnesses- and in fact pursuant to the criminal
rules97 can require that the cost of calling a witness, both process
and fees, will be paid by the government if the defendant is unable
to pay.
Part C (16)h is a motion for dismissal for delay in prosecution.
The federal criminal rules provide that if there is unnecessary
delay, the indictment, information or complaint may be dismissed.,8
The Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
is of course also involved in a motion for dismissal because of
delay. The purpose of the Rule allowing dismissal for unnecessary
delay and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial are
said to be directed to a delay in prosecution to which the defendant
has not contributed. 9' Such a motion is addressed to the court's
discretion. 00
Part C (16) i is a motion to inquire into the reasonableness of
the defendant's bail,1' while Part C (16) j provides for a motion
for continuance. This motion for continuance is directed to the
court's discretion.10 2
Part C (16) k is a motion to change the venue of the trial. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that venue may be
transferred03 and whether a transfer should be allowed is again
discretionary with the court.104
Parts (17)a-j of the Omnibus Order sets out a series of motions
which the government may make. The court's primary concern
must be protection of the defendant's constitutional rights. The most
common right involved is the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. This privilege must be weighed against the public
interest in obtaining evidence. Usually, an inspection of the bodily
94. United States v. BronSton, 321 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
95. Untfed States v. Rosenstein. 303 F. Supp. 210 (S.D. N.Y. 1969).
96. United States v Kaufman, 393 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1968).
97,. FED. R. CR'M. P. 17(b).
98. FED. R. CRIar. P. 48(b).
99. United States v. Alagia, 17 FzD. R.D. 15 (D.C. Del. 1955).
100. United States v. Aberson, 419 F.2d 820 (2nd Cir. 1970).
101. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46; 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et. seq.; U.S. OONST. amend VIII also
states that excessive bail is prohibited.
102. Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877
(1968).
103. FED. R. CRiM. P. 21.
104. United States v. Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364, (8th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917
(1971) ; United States v. Herold. 309 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
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features of the defendant by the tribunal or by a witness does not
violate the privilege because it does not call upon the accused to be
a witness. 105 A motion to have the defendant appear in a lineup as
provided in Part (17) a could properly be granted as the Supreme
Court has said that a lineup does not violate a defendant's privilege
against self incrimination. However, conducting one without counsel
would violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 106
Motions to have the defendant speak for voice identification;
be fingerprinted; pose for photographs; try on articles of clothing;
surrender clothing for experimental purposes or comparison; permit
the taking of specimens from under fingernails; permit taking of
samples of blood, hair and other materials of his body which
involves no unreasonable intrusion; provide samples of handwriting;
or submit to an external physical inspection of his body are provided
for in Parts (17)b-j respectively. These motions are proper and
can be granted by the court without fear of Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination violations.107
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion presents in summary fashion the pre-
vailing law on the matters which are found in the Omnibus Order
which is being used in the Federal District Court in North Dakota
in some criminal cases. It is clear that if the government cooperates
fully and voluntarily discloses, or is ordered to disclose all the mat-
ters covered by the order, the defendant will receive far more in-
formation than that to which he is presently entitled. Thus, the scope
of discovery under the Omnibus procedure is considerably greater
for the defendant than has been possible in criminal proceedings
in the past. On the other hand, the disclosures which the defendant
may voluntarily make, or be ordered to make are really nothing
more than the government is entitled to under the current statutes,
criminal rules and case law.
All of the arguments made by proponents of broad pre-trial dis-
covery have not necessarily been borne out by the Omnibus proce-
dure as used in North Dakota. However, sufficient time has perhaps
not yet elapsed for a fair evaluation of all these arguments.
It is true that virtually every defense motion which it is possible
to make is listed on the form and that this would be useful to counsel
105. 8 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE, § 2265 at 386 (McNoughton Rev. 1961).
106. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
107. See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood test); Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (try on clothing), United States v. Moore, 466 F.2d
547 (3rd Cir. 1972) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIENCE, § 2265 at 386-400 (McNaughton Rev. (1961))
and cases cited therein.
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unfamiliar with criminal practice. Whether more finality is guaran-
teed by the procedure, because all of these motions can be made or
not made at a single pre-trial hearing, is not assured. Finality will
depend on whether the courts, on motions for a new trial or appeal,
based on failure of counsel to make some of these motions, hold
that their right to such a motion was waived when they choose not
to make it or, conversely, hold that the defendant is not bound by
his decision not to make the motion at the pre-trial hearing. Whether
more pleas of guilty will be forthcoming because of extensive dis-
closure is as yet debatable but usage of the procedure has not been
extensive enough to detect such a trend. The argument that exten-
sive pre-trial discovery will identify potentially significant constitu-
tional issues is not convincing because in most instances these issues
are readily identifiable at the commencement of the case anyway.
If, however, full disclosures are made by both the government
and the defendant it is probable that cases will proceed more
smoothly. Trial strategy could be completely determined prior to
jury selection if there was full disclosure. Accordingly, it seems that
the defendant has much to gain by participating in the Omnibus
procedure, but it is still an open question whether the government
derives any benefit from it.
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APPENDIX A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
'FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH -DAKOTA
DIVISION




ORDER ON OWINIBUS PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
(INSTRUCTIONS: If an item numbered below is not applicable to ,this case, then
counsel will note the same in the margin opposite he item numbered with the
letters, "N.A.")
A. DISCOVERY BY DEFENDANT (Circle appropriate response)
1. The defendant states he (has (has not) obtained full discovery and (has)
(has not) inspected the government file. (If government has refused discovery
of certain materials, defendant's counsel shall state nature of such material.)
2. The government states it (has) (has not) disclosed all evidence in its pos-
session, favorable to defendant on the issue of guilt.
3. The defendant requests and moves for: (Circled subparagraph shows mo-
tion requested)
a. ,Discovery of all oral, written or recorded statements or memorandum
of them made by defendant to investigating officers or to third parties and in
the possession of the government.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
b. Discovery of the names of the government's witnesses and their state-
ments.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
c. Inspection of all physical or documentary evidence in government's
possession.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
4. Defendant, having had discovery of items 2 and 3a, 3b and 3c, requests
and moves for discovery and inspection of all further and additional information
coming into the government's possession as to Items 2 and 3a, 3b, and 3c between
this conference and -trial.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
5. The defendant moves and requests the following -information, and the gov-
ernment states: (Circle the appropriate responses)
a. The government (will) (will not) rely on prior acts or convictions of
a similar nature for proof of knowledge or intent. Defendant stipulates to the
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following prior convictions, but reserves the right to object (on grounds other
than authenticity) to their introduction in evidence at trial:
Date of Convictior' Offense
Date of 'Conviction Offense




b. The government (will) (may) (will not) call expert witnesses to testi-
'fy. The name of each witness, 'his qualifications, the subject of this testimony,
and his reports (have been) (will be) supplied to the defendant.
c. Reports of physical or mental examinations in the control of the gov-
ernment (have been) (will be) supplied to defendant.
d. Reports of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons and other
reports of experts in the control of the government, pertaining to this case
(have been) (will be) supplied to defendant.
e. Inspection and/or copying of any books, papers, documents, photo-
graphs or tangible objections which the government:
1) obtained from or which belong to defendant, or
2) which will be used at the hearing or trial,
(have been) (will be) supplied to defendant.
f. Information in the United States Attorney's possession concerning a
prior conviction of any person the governmet intends to call as a witness at
the hearing or trial ,(has been) (will be) supplied to defendant.
g. The government (will) (may) (will not) use any prior felony convic-
tion for impeachment of defendant if he testifies.
Date of Conviction- Offense
Date of 'Conviction Offense
Date of Conviction Offense
Defendant stipulates to such prior convictions, but reserves the right to object




6. The government states that:
a. Proceedings before the grand jury (were) (were not) recorded.
b. Transcription of the grand jury -testimony of the accused, and all per-
sons whom the prosecution intends to call as witnesses at a hearing or trial
(have been) (will be) (will not be) supplied. The defendant (moves) (does not
move) for the production of transcripts of such testimony. The 'hearing on the
motion will 'be set before a United States District Judge upon notice.
7. The government states that:
a. There (was) (was not) an informer (or lookout) involved.
b. The informer (will) (will not) be called as a witness at the trial.
c. It ('has) (has not) given defendant the name, address and phone num-
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her of the informer.
d. It will claim privilege of nondisclosure. The defendant moves for the
disclosure of the name of such informer. The hearing on the motion will be
set before a District Judge upon notice.
8. The government states -that there:
a. (has) (has not) been any electronic surveillance of the defendant or
his premises;
b. (,has) (has not) been any lead obtained by electronic surveillance of
defendant's person or premises.
9. Any information the government has, indicating entrapment of defendant,
(has been) (will be) supplied to defendant.
B. DISCOVERY BY THE GOVERNMENT
The following statements are made by the defendant in response to the gov-
ernment's request:
10. Competency, Insanity and Diminished Mental Responsibility.
a. There (is) (is not) any claim of incompetency of defendant to stand
trial.
b. Defendant '(will) (will not) rely on a defense of insanity at the time
of the offense.
c. Defendant (has) (,has not) supplied the name of his witnesses, both
lay and professional, on the issue.
d. Defendant (has) (has not) permitted the government to inspect and
copy all medical reports under his control or the control of his attorney.
e. Defendant (will) (will not) submit to a psychiatric examination by a
court-appointed doctor on the issue of his sanity at the time of the alleged
offense.
11. Alibi.
a. Defendant (will) (will not) rely on an alibi.
b. Defendant (has) (has not) furnished the govermnent a list of his alibi
witnesses (but desires to be present during any interview of such witnesses).
12. Scientific Testing.
a. Defendant (has) (has not) furnished -the government the results of
scientific tests, experiments or comparisons and the names of the persons
Who conducted the tests.
b. Defendant (has) (has not) provided the government with all records
and memoranda constituting documentary evidence respecting such tests in
'his possession or under his control or ('has) (,has not) disclosed the where-
abouts of said material. If such documentary evidence is not available but
destroyed, the defendant '(has) (has not) stated the time, place and date of
said destruction and the location of reports, if any concerning the destruction.
13. Nature of Defense.
a. 'Defendant states that his defense includes: (circle appropriate re-
sponse)
1) lack of knowledge of contraband
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2) alibi
3) diminshed mental responsibility
4) entrapment
5) self defense
6) general denial. Defendant (will) (will not) offer evidence after gov-
ernment rests.
b. Defendant (will) (will not) waive husband and wife privilege.
c. Defendant (wll) (may) (will not) testify.
d. Defendant (will) (may) (will not) call additional witnesses.
e. Defendant will) (will not) call character witrnesses.
f. Defendant will supply the government names, addresses, and phone
numbers of additional witnesses for defendant days before trial.
14. Defendant's counsel states that: (circle appropriate response)
a. As of -the date indicated below he (does) (does not) know of any prob-
lems involving delay in arraignment, the Miranda Rule or illegal search and
seizure or arrest, or any other constitutional problem, except as set forth
above.
b. He has inspected this form, and (does) (does not) know of any mo-
tion or matter that defendant desires to present to the Court, other than those
indicated on this form.
c. There (is) (is not) (may be) a probability of a disposition of this case
without trial.
d. Defendant (will) (will not) waive a jury and ask for a court trial.
C. MOTIONS REQUIRING SEPARATE HEARING BEFORE U. S. DISTRICT
JUDGE.
15. The defendant moves: (circled subparagraph shows motion requested)
a. To suppress physical evidence in the government's possession on the
grounds of: (circle appropriate response)
1) illegal search and seizure
2) illegal arrest
The hearing on such motion to suppress will be set before a United States
'District Judge upon notice.
(Defendant will file a formal motion to suppress such evidence accompa-
nied by a memorandum brief within days. The government will tile
a responsive memorandum brief within - days after receipt of de-
fendant's brief.)
b. To suppress admissions or confessions made by defendants on grounds
of: (circle appropriate subparagraph)
1) delay in arraignment
2) coercion or unlawful inducement
3) violation of the [Miranda Rule
4) unlawful arrest
5) improper use of lineup (Wade, Gilbert, Stovall decisions)
6) improper use of photographs
The hearing on such motion to suppress is set for:
1) date of trial, or
2) upon notice.
c. All material uncovered during the course of surveillance (will) (will
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not) be supplied to defendant. The defendant (moves) (does not move) for the
production of such material. The hearing on the motion will be set before a
United States District Judge upon notice.
(MOTIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THIS OMNIBUS PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(3) FRCrP SHALL BE AC-
CEPTED AS HAVING BEEN TIMELY MADE)
16. The defendant moves: (circled paragraph indicates the motion)
a. To dismiss for failure of the indictment or information to state an
offense.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
b. To dismiss the indictment or information (or count thereof)
on the ground of duplicity.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
c. To sever case of defendant and for a
separate trial.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
d. To sever count of the indictment or information and
for a separate trial -thereon.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Dare)
e. For a Bill of Particulars.
(Granted) (Denied)
United !States District Judge (Date)
f. To take a deposition of witness
for testimonial purposes and not for discovery.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
g. To require government to secure the appearance of witnesss-
who is subject to government direction at the trial or hearing.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
h. To dismiss for delay in prosecution.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
i. To inquire into the reasonableness of bail. Amount fixed.
(Affirmed) (Modified to
United States District Judge (Date)
j. To continue the trial of the case.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
k. To change the venue of the trial.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
17. The government moves that the defendant: (Circle appropriate paragraph)
a. appear in a lineup.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
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b. speak for voice identification by witness.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
c. be fingerprinted.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
d. pose for photographs (not involving a reenactment of the crime).
(Granted) (Denied)
United 'States District Judge (Date)
e. try on articles of clothing.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
f. surrender clothing or shoes for experimental comparison.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
g. permit the taking of specimens of material under fingernails.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
h. permit the taking of samples of blood, hair and other materials of his
body which involves no unreasonable intrusion.
(Granted) (Denied)
United 'States District Judge (Date)
i. provide samples of his handwriting.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
j. submit to a physical external inspection of his body.
(Granted) (Denied)
United States District Judge (Date)
D. STIPULATIONS
Stipulations shall be executed by defendant, his counsel and the government's
counsel and shall be attached hereto and filed at the omnibus hearing. Witness
lists will be exchanged prior to trial.
E. Trial Date and Time:
Trial Place:
F. Trial by ('Court) (Jury) Ordered.
G. Estimated trial time:
H.
APPROVED:




United States District Judge
Date
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APPENDIX B
The Honorable Bruce M. Van Sickle
Judge, United States District Court
For the District of North Dakota
Room 213-Federal Building
Minot, North Dakota 58701
RE: Case No.
( ) I have discussed the Omnibus Hearing Procedure with my client and wish
to inform the Court that we do desire to participate.
( ) I have discussed the Omnibus Hearing Procedure with my client and wish




cc: United States Attorney
Clerk, United States District Court
